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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE E. CHARLTON,
Pla~ntiff

and Respondeut,
Case No.

-vs.-

9243

GEORGE L. HACIUJT·T,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELI~1INARY

STATEMENT

The parties will be referred to as they appeared
in the lower court.
The numbers appearing in parentheses refers to the
record.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in appellant's brief
is incomplete. Additional facts, as hereinafter related,
we believe, have a bearing on the case.
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The plaintiff is a resident of Ogden, Utah, and a railroad en1ployre by occup«tion (R. 20). The defendant is
a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah, and an insurance and
stock broker by occupabon (R. 33).
On the 15th day of February, 1956, plaintiff and an
unidentified third person were discussing certain business matters in the office of a local attorney. At the
conclusion of this conference, plaintiff \Yas taken by said
third person to the office of defendant located on the 7th
floor of the Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah. The purpose of the 1neeting was to discuss the
proposed sale by plaintiff of his 1948 Willys Jeep Automobile and a 1951 Korsair 23-foot trailer house (R. 21).
After the usual introductions, defendant advised
plaintiff he was interested in purchasing the equipn1ent
(R. 21). The parties discussed the sale, and defendant
advised plaintiff if he would sell the equipment to him,
defendant would transfer to plaintiff 68,333 shares of
J-A Uranium Con1pany stock. Defendant stated if plaintiff would enter into such an agreement, \\:ithin sixty
days plaintiff would receive more for his equipment
than if he sold the same for cash (R. 22, 23). Plaintiff
agreed to the transaction, and the written agreement
which was introduced in evidence as Exhibit number 1
was executed.
The plaintiff transferred to defendant the possession
of the Jeep automobile and the house trailer. The defendant failed and refused to deliver to plaintiff the
68,333 shares of stock of the J-A Uranium Company,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
and as a l'P~ult of such refusal, plaintiff instituted this
proceeding.
Plaintiff filed an a1nended corn plaint ( R. 1:!, 13) and
defendant filed an ans\ver to said an1ended complaint
( R. 6). In the anS\\?er and at the pretrial conference, defendant contended he was not acting as an individual
in the execution of the agreement, but as an agent of the
Ackerson-Hackett Invest1nent Company, a Utah corporation. Defendant further contended that if court entered
a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant,
the amount of damages to be awarded to plaintiff \vould
be .li1nited to the reasonable rnarket value of the 68,333
shares of J-A Uranium Company stock at the time of the
alleged breach of the agreement (R. 17).
Trial \vas held before the court, without a jury, and
the court found as Finding of Fact Number One, (R. 47),
that defendant entered into this contract as an individual
and not as an agent of the Ackerson-Hackett Investment
Co1npany. The court further found as Finding of Fact
K lun ber Three, ( R. 47), that on the date of this agreelnent the reasonable market value of the Jeep automobile
was in the sum of $550.00 and the value of the house
trailer \Yas the sum of $1,500.00. The court further found
in said Finding of Fact that for a period of 90 days subsequent to execution of said agreement a share of stock
of J-A Uranium Company had a reasonable market value
of $0.03 (three cents) per share (R. 48). Based on said
Findings of Fact the court entered judgment for plaintiff
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

and against defendant in the sum of $2,049.99 (R. 50).
The entry of this judgment is the subject of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
'rRIAL COURT DID NO'T ERR IN FINDING DEFENDANT WAS A PARTY TO THE AGREEMENT.
POINT II.
TRIAL COURT DID NO·T ERR IN AWARDING DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,049.99.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
TRIAL COURT DID NO'T ERR IN FINDING DEFENDANT WAS A PARTY TO THE AGREEMENT.

In this case, the agreement which is the subject of
the appeal was signed by both the plaintiff and defendant
personally. In view of this fact, and the allegations contained in the answer of defendant and his contentions
at the pretrial conference, the issue of whether or not
defendant executed this agreement as an agent of a corporation was presented to the trial court for a determination. At the trial, the court resolved this issue against
defendant and made a Finding of Fact that on the date
defendant executed the agreement he did so in his individual capacity and not as an agent of a corporation.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that, in view of the
'vording of the agreement and the manner it was signed,
the issue of agency was a proper question of fact to be
determined by the trial court. See Vol. 2 Am. Jur.,
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Agency, Sec. 454, p. 359. The court, having resolved
this issue in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant,
the question now presented to this court is ''Thether there
is any evidence \vhich, viewed in a light most favorable
to plain tiff, sustains the finding of the trial court. \V e
respectfully submit the record is abundant \vith such
evidence.
Plaintiff testified in great detail concerning the
facts and circun1stances leading to the ultiu1ate execution
of the agree1nent. The in1portant portions of this testiInony reveal that plaintiff's initial visit to defendant's
office was after he vvras advised defendant was interested
in purchasing a jeep and a trailer house (R. 21). That
\vhen he vvent to the office, he \vas not a-vvare of any
Ackerson-Hackett Investment Company being interested
in such a purchase. That after being introduced to defendant, the defendant immediately confirmed his prior
information by indicating he could sure use the jeep and
trailer and he vvanted to purchase them (R. 21). The
evidence revealed that during the discussions concerning
the sale, defendant advised plaintiff if he vvould trade
the jeep and trailer house for stock in a uranium colnpany, \Yhich defendant was then offering to the public and
\\Thich \Vould be delivered to him within ninety days,
plaintiff would secure a greater monetary return than if
the sale were for cash (R. 22, 23). That only after this
suggestion did plain tiff agree to accept 68,333 shares of
J-A Uranium Company in exchange for his jeep and
trailer.
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Another very important point 1n the record is the
testin1ony hy both plaintiff and defendant that during
the negotiations prior to the execution of the agreernent,
the name Ackerson-Hackett Invest1nent Con1pany ":"as
never 1nentioned, and defendant never advised plaintiff
he \vas dealing \vith the company ( R. 23, ±2).
Even after the agreement \\'"as executed, plaintiff
continued his negotiations \vith the defendant on a personal and individual basis. Plaintiff testified a fe\v days
after the agree1nent \vas executed, he discovered the jeep
autoinobile was in need of certain repairs and suggested
to defendant it be eliminated from the transaction.
Defendant again affirmed his position that he needed
the jeep and wanted to continue in accordance \\"ith the
original terms of the agreement (R. 23).
From an analysis of the foregoing testimony, it is
obvious there is evidence in the record to support the
finding by the court that defendant executed the agreement as an individual and not as an agent of the corporation.
The defendant, under Point I of his brief, 1nakes
reference to certain rules enunciated in the Restatement
of La\v on Agency. While "\Ve do not argue \\ith these
rules, we subn1it they are not applicable to this ease.
Defendant takes the position that, even in the face
of the testimony of plaintiff, plaintiff should have known
he vvas dealing \Vi th the disclosed principal in this transaction. In support of his position, he makes reference
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to certain portions of the testimony. In these references,
ho,vever, he fails to note the portions of the record 'vhich
adequately refute his contentions.
(iounsel states that, because the na1ne _..\ckersonHackett \vas on the door of the office of defendant, this
fact put hin1 on notice of the existence of the corporation
and placed a duty upon him to make inquiry concerning
the corporation. Counsel fails, however, to cite the portion of the record "~here defendant ad1nitted his name \vas
also on the door in a conspicuous place and separate fro1n
the corporation (R. ±2). In view of this fact, and having
in mind the purpose of plaintiff in going to the office,
"Te submit, plaintiff was under no duty of inquiry concerning Ackerson-Hackett Investment Company. Our
position is further substantiated by the fact the defendant, himself, during the entire transaction made no indication that Ackerson-Hackett Investment ·Company
was to be considered as a party to this transaction.
Counsel 1nakes reference to the fact the agreement
between the parties was written on Ackerson-Hackett
stationery, and the company name was also placed on
the stock confirmation. Again, counsel fails to note the
portion of the record where plaintiff testified that, after
the terms of the transaction were completed, defendant
requested his secretary to get him a piece of paper, in
order that these terms could be reduced to writing (R.
26). We submit the letterhead contained on this piece
of pap·er was not of such consequence as to place plaintiff
on any notice he was dealing with a corporation. The
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in1portance of the piece of paper is limited to its recital
concerning the terms of the agreement. It is our position
the immateriality of the stationery is substantiated by
the fact the corporation designated in the letterhead 'vas
not noted as a party to the transaction, and the signature
of defendant vvas not in a corporate capacity.
\Vith respect to the stock confirmation slip, 'Ye again
refer to the record, where plaintiff testified that the
name being on the document "\Vas of no importance because his concern was whether he would receive the stock
as agreed by defendant (R. 28).
Under Point I of his brief, defendant makes the
further statement there is no testimony in the record
fro1n which it can be inferred defendant made any prolnises to plaintiff. We take issue with this staten1ent and
contend the testimony describing the conduct of defendant during this entire transaction reveals certain proper
inferences.
'There is no argument that the agreement in this case
was prepared in the office of defendant under his supervision and direction. We sub1nit that fron1 these facts
it may be inferred that, if defendant "\Vere executing the
agreement as an agent of the Ackerson-Hackett Investment Con1pany, this fact could have been 1nade clear
and understandable by anyone reading the agreen1ent.
If the corporation were to have an interest in this agreement, the defendant could have 1nade it a party to the
agreement. If the defendant did desire to make the company a party, he could have signed his name in a corpo-
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rate capacity and on behalf of the corporation. The defendant, however, failed to take these simple measures,
and we submit the court can infer from these facts he did
not intend the company to be a party.
The defendant in this action testified he did not
know whether this transaction \vere included in the minutes of the corporation. Again, we state the failure of
defendant to complete the transaction in accordance
with proper corporate management; the court can infer
the company was never intended to be made a party.
Plaintiff respectfully submits the trial court, after
properly weighing the testimony in this case, believed
the plaintiff and his testimony. The record justifies and
substantiates our position that the corporation was never
a party to the agreement. It is our further position that
defendant's attempt to incorporate the corporation in
this agreement is a rather shoddy effort on his part to
obtain the fruits of the agreement without bearing the
responsibility of paying the agreed price.
We respectfully subinit the evidence in this case substantiates the finding by the trial court, and said ruling
should be sustained by this court.
POINT II.
TRIAL COURT DID N0 T ERR IN AWARDING DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,049.99.
1

The defendant in this action admitted he failed to
deliver to plaintiff the 68,333 shares of stock of the J -A
Uranium Company. In assessing the damages for the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
breach of the contract by defendant, the trial court found
that on the date of the agreement and for a period of
ninety days thereafter, the stock of the J-A Uranium
Company had a reasonable value of three cents per share
(R. 48). The trial court, having so ruled, the issue now
presented to this court is whether the evidence, viewed
in a light most favorable to plaintiff, sustains the finding by the court.
Plaintiff testified on direct examination as follows:
(R. 24, 25)

"Q.

The contract which we have introduced talks
about par value stock. Did Mr. Hackett say
anything as to the value of the stock~

A.

Yes, sir. He said that it had been sold for
three cents but he said the position of the
company and everything he was sure I would
get a lot more than that out of it; that three
cents was the par value of it."

The defendant, on cross examination, testified as
..
follows: (R. 42) :

"Q. Now this public offering, does that mean it
vvas offered to the public for buying-?
A.

Yes.

Q. And that was being done on February 15,
1956~

A.

It was either in the process right then, ~fr.
Dibblee, or it was about to commence. I can't
say exactly, but it "\Vas right within that period
of tiine, yes.
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Q.

But shortly thereafter, 68,333 shares of J -A
Uranium stock, it was possible to purchase
those shares f

A.

Yes.

Q.

And if you purchased them you would be
paying three cents per share f

A.

Right."

We respectfully submit that the foregoing testimony
supports the ruling of the court as to the reasonable
value of the uranium stock.
Defendant, in his brief, contends the evidence is not
sufficient for the court to find value of the stock. In
support of his position, he cites to the court certain
references enunciating the rule for determining value
of stock when there is no evidence ·of value. In view of
the testimony, these authorities are obviously not in
point.
There is one portion of the citation which is applicable to this case and is worth repeating. In 18 Corpus
JuriJs Secundum Corporati~on Sec. 415, which states as
follows:

"* * * In order that stock may have a market
value, it is not necessary that it be the subject
of daily traffic by being bought and sold on the
streets or in the frequent dealings of tradespeople; it is enough if it is occasionally the subject
of sale or exchange in the· community so as to
fix upon the stock at different times .a customary
price."
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In applyii,lg the foregoing to the case at bar, we
. submit this stock has experienced sufficient activity for
it to have a value. We have not only sales referred to
by the parties, but also the sale now under consideration
by this court. In the case at bar, the evidence revealed
at the time of the execution of this contract the reasonable value of plaintiff's jeep automobile was the sum
of $550.00 and of the trailer house the sum of $1,500.00
(R. 24). Defendant, by his own agreement, computed
that property having a total value of $2,050.00 was
equal to 68,333 shares of stock of the J-A Uranium Company. By the use of simple arithmetic, it is shown that
the opinion of the defendant supports the finding of the
court.
We respectfully submit that the finding by the trial
court as to the value of the stock involved in this case is
supported by the evidence and should be affirmed by
this court.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that finding by the trial
court that defendant executed the agree1nent as an individual is prop·erly sustained by the evidence. That the
finding by the court that the reasonable value of the
stock was three cents per share is also sustained by the
evidence. The trial court, having properly ruled con-
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cern1ng these matters, the judgment entered by the
court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS and BLACI(
By RICHARD C. DIBBLEE
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